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Recent Cases
INCOME TAX-LIABILITY OF A LIFE INSURANCE
BENEFICIARY FOR UNPAID INCOME TAXES
OF THE INSURED
The Supreme Court in two recent cases has clarified the liability
of a life insurance beneficiary for the unpaid income taxes of the
insured, a subject about which the decisions of the lower federal
courts had been in great conflict. However, in doing so, it produced
apparently opposite results in two similar fact situations.
Dr. Milton J. Stem died a resident of Lexington, Kentucky, on
June 12, 1949. Nearly six years after his death, the Tax Court held
that Dr. Stem was liable for an income tax deficiency of $32,777.51
for the years 1944 through 1947. Dr. Stem's widow had received
$47,282.02 as beneficiary of life insurance policies held by him. Dr.
Stem had retained the right to change the beneficiary and to draw
the cash surrender value of each policy until his death when the
cash surrender value had been $297,259.68. Because the assets of the
estate were insufficient to meet the tax liability, the Commissioner
proceeded against Mrs. Stem as transferee of the property of the tax-
payer under section 311 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.1
The respondent petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of the
liability assessed against her. The Tax Court held she was liable for
the full amount of the deficiencies out of the life insurance proceeds.
The Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, holding that the re-
spondent was not liable even for the amount of the cash surrender
value.2 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Held: affirmed, with
Justices Black, Warren, and Whittaker dissenting. Without finding
it necessary to determine whether the petitioner was a transferee
within the meaning of section 311, the Court held that the existence
and extent of the beneficiary's liability under the transferee provision
for an income tax deficiency assessed against the insured after his
death was governed by local state law. Under applicable Kentucky
statute,3 the widow was not liable to her husband's creditors and
INow Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6901 (a) (1) (A) (i).2 Stem v. Commissioner, 242 F. 2d 822 (6th Cir. 1957).
3Ky. Rev. Stat. § 297.150 (1948), now Ky. Rev. Stat. § 804.691 (1) & (2)(1959), which provides:(1) When a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own
life or on another life in favor of some person other than himself having an
insurable interest therein, the lawful beneficiary thereof, other than the
person effecting the insurance or his legal representatives, shall be entitled
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hence not liable to the federal government, in the absence of any
finding that the insured had paid the premiums with the intent to
defraud his creditors, or that he was insolvent at any time prior to
his death. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). 4
Herman Bess died a resident of New Jersey in 1950. His wife
was the beneficiary of eight insurance policies on his life from which
she received $63,576.95 in proceeds. The cash surrender value of
these policies at the death of the insured was $3,362.53. In seven of
the policies Bess had retained the right to change the beneficiary and
to draw or borrow against the cash surrender value, while in the
eighth he had reserved only the right to change the beneficiary. None
of the premium payments were made in fraud of creditors. At the
time of his death, Bess owed federal income taxes for 1945 through
1949. Prior thereto, notice and demand were made upon him for pay-
ment of the deficiencies he acknowledged as owing for 1945 and 1946.
No payment on the amount owing for 1946 was made by him in his
lifetime or by his estate after his death. The government brought
this action to recover in equity from his beneficiary the entire amount
of taxes owed by the insured at the time of his death-8,874.57. The
District Court entered judgment for the government for the total
tax unpaid,5 but the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reduced the
judgment to the amount of the cash surrender values, which was less
than the tax deficiency for 1946.6 On certiorari to the Supreme Court,
Held: affirmed, with Justices Harlan and Burton dissenting. The
Court held that, under applicable state law, the cash surrender value
constituted "property" of the insured, to which a federal tax lien
attached under section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19397
prior to his death. Such a lien was not extinguished by the death of
the insured but followed his "property" when it was transferred to
the beneficiary as part of the proceeds. United States v. Bess, 357
U.S. 51 (1958).8
to its proceeds against the creditors and representatives of the person
effecting the same.
(2) Subject to the statute of limitations, the amount of any premiums
for such insurance paid in fraud of creditors, with interest thereon,, shall
inure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy....
4 Commented upon in 44 A.B.A.J. 885 (1958), 44 Cornell L.Q. 278 (1959),
8 De Paul L. Rev. 131 (1958), 57 Mich. L. Rev. 285 (1958), 31 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 108 (1958) and 14 Tax L. Rev. 137 (1958).
5 United States v. Bess, 134 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.J. 1955).
6 United States v. Bess, 243 F. 2d 675 (Sd Cir. 1957).
7 Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321, which provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United
States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or per-
sonal, belonging to such person.
s Commented upon in 44 A.B.A.J. 886 (1958), 44 Cornell L.Q. 278 (1959),
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In reaching its decision in the Stern case, the Court had to find:
(1) that there was no federal statute which defined the substantive
liability of life insurance beneficiaries for the unpaid income taxes
of the insured; and (2) that there had been no expression of con-
gressional preference for a uniform system of liability to be based
on federal decisional law. On the basis of the legislative history
of its predecessor-section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926-the
Court concluded that section 811 of the 1939 Code neither created
nor defined the substantive liability of a transferee but merely pro-
vided a new procedure by which the Government might collect taxes.
After a perusal of House and Senate reports, the Court was satisfied
that the design of this section was to enable the government to col-
lect a tax deficiency from the transferee in the same manner as
from the taxpayer himself, without in any way changing the extent
of the transferee's liability under existing law. Since Congress, when
it passed the predecessor to section 311, must have been aware that
the prevailing practice was to use state statutes in determining liability,
and since it must have known that, by reason of varying definitions of
liability under these statutes, this practice resulted in an absence of
uniformity, the court in the Stern case reasoned that, by disclaining
any intention to define or change existing liability, Congress had
disavowed any desire for uniformity of liability among states.9
As the federal courts must now apply state decisional law in
diversity cases brought by private creditors within the larger field
of creditor's rights, the Court felt that, in the absence of any manifest
desire by Congress for uniform liability, any attempt to formulate
a body of federal decisional law for the small field of federal tax
cases would be "episodic." Moreover, they considered such an effort
unjustified in light of a "flexible body of pertinent state law being
continuously adapted to changing circumstances affecting all credi-
tors."' 0 Therefore, "until Congress speaks to the contrary, the existence
and extent of liability should be determined by state law." (Em-
phasis added).
The dissenting Justices in the Stern case took the position that, in
the absence of the plainest congressional mandate to the contrary,
8 De Paul L. Rev. 131 (1958); 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 108 (1958); 14 Tax L. Rev.
187 (1958).
) Moreover, as the Court pointed out, uniformity is not always the federal
policy. Under § 70 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 110 (1952) state law is applied to determine what property of the
bankrupt has been transferred in fraud of creditors, so that what is a good transfer
in one jurisdiction might not be so in another.




liability for federal taxes should be determined by uniform principles
of federal law. In their opinion, the legislative history of section
280 of the Revenue Act of 1926 fell far short of a congressional direc-
tion that the tax liability of a transferee be determined by state law.
To them, uniformity in the imposition and collection of federal taxes
was extremely desirable. They would hold, therefore, "as a matter
of federal law, that where a transferee receives property from a tax-
payer who is left with insufficient assets to pay his federal taxes, the
transferee is liable for those taxes to the extent he has not given fair
consideration for the property received."' 2 The dissenters agreed with
the majority decision in the Bess case that the cash surrender values
of the policies were property of the insured which passed to the bene-
ficiary upon the insured's death. On this basis, they would have held
that the beneficiary was responsible for the unpaid taxes of the in-
sured to the extent of the cash surrender value just prior to his death.
Whereas the Court in the Stern case found it unnecessary to
consider the extent to which the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy is a transferee of any property of the insured, this was the
main issue with which it was faced in the Bess case. In the latter
case the taxpayer had been notified of his tax liability and demand
for payment had been made on him prior to his death. On his
neglect or refusal to pay, the amount of the tax became a lien in favor
of the United States upon all property or rights to property, real or
personal, belonging to him. However, in order for his beneficiary
to be subject to this lien, the insured must have had some prop-
erty in the policies during his lifetime, and on his death this prop-
erty interest must have been transferred to the beneficiary, with lien
annexed, as part of the proceeds.
The Court in Bess interpreted section 367013 as creating no prop-
erty rights but merely attributing federally defined consequences to
rights created under state law. Looking to applicable state law,14
the Court found that, since the insured could not enjoy in any way
the proceeds of the policy during his lifetime, he had no "property"
in the proceeds (within the meaning of section 3670) to which the
federal tax lien could attach. However, since the insured had the
right under the policy to compel the insurer to pay him its cash sur-
render value upon cancellation, he did have "property" rights (within
section 3670) in this amount. The Court therefore held that a federal
12 Id. at 50.
13 See note 6 supra.
14 Middlesex County Welfare -Board v. Moto]insky, 134 N. J. Eq. 323, 35
A. 2d 463 (Ch. 1944); Slurzberg v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 15 N. J.
Misc. 423, 192 A. 451 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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tax lien attached to this interest of the insured during his lifetime,
despite the fact that it was not subject to creditors' liens under state
law.15
[O]nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient
[property] interests in the insured to satisfy the requirements of§ 8670, state law is inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens
created by federal statutes in favor of the United States.16
The Court then rejected the contention that the rights of the
insured in the cash surrender value expired upon his death, and that
the beneficiary received the proceeds as performance by the in-
surer of a separate promise to pay. Instead, it reasoned that "in eco-
nomic reality, the insurer pays the beneficiary the insured's 'fund'
[the surplus of the paid premiums accumulated to make up the cash
surrender value], plus another amount sufficient to perform the in-
surer's promise to pay the proceeds on the insured's death."17 On
this basis, the court held that, "for purposes of § 8670, there was a
transfer of property from the insured to Mrs. Bess, and that the lien
attached to the property before his death followed it into her hands."' 8
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Justice Burton joined, dis-
sented in an opinion in which he criticized the court's application
of the "fund" theory to determine the specific reach of a lien under
section 8670. He quoted extensively from an observation of Judge
Learned Hand in a similar case: 19
The obligations of an insurer in a policy of life insurance is made
up of a number of promises, of which one is to pay the beneficiary
the amount of the insurance-'the proceeds'-and another is to pay the
'surrender value' to the insured upon his demand. The performances
of these promises are not only separate, but inconsistent with each
other: the payment of the 'surrender value' cancels the promise to
pay the 'proceeds' and the promise to pay the proceeds' assumes that
the insured has not demanded and received the 'surrender value'. 20
On the basis of this reasoning, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded:
[A]lthough the cash surrender values of life insurance policies were
here properly considered property of a taxpayer to which federal tax
liens attached during the taxpayer's life, these values cannot be
deemed to exist after the taxpayer's death. It follows that the lien
terminated at the time of death .... 21
Before these decisions of the Supreme Court, there existed simul-
taneously in the federal courts four separate and distinct positions
on the income tax liability of a life insurance beneficiary.22 (1) The
15N. J. Stat. §§ 17:34-28,29 (1937).
16 357 U.S. at 56, 57.
17 Id. at 59.
18 Ibid.
19 United States v. Behrens, 230 F. 2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956).
20 Id. at 506.
21357 U.S. at 61.
22 Grayck, "Income Tax Transferee Liability of a Life Insurance Beneficiary,"
13 Tax. L. Rev. 313, 316 (1958).
[Vol. 47,
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Tax Court had allowed the Commissioner to recover his claim to
the full extent of the insurance proceeds.23 (2) The Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, had rejected recovery of the full proceeds on the
ground that they were not the property of the delinquent taxpayer.
Moreover, after having held that the cash surrender value was his
property, it had denied recovery of this amount on the ground that,
under applicable state law, the beneficiary was not liable, at law or in
equity, for the deceased's income taxes. 24 (3) The Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, had accepted the finding of the previous court that only
the cash surrender value was the property of the taxpayer. However,
it had rejected the idea that state law was applicable to determine
liability, and substituting instead the general law laid down by the
federal courts, it had found that there was liability on the part of the
beneficiary for this amount.2 5 (4) In contrast, the Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit, had held that the beneficiary was not a transferee of
the deceased taxpayer, since after the death of the taxpayer there
remained no cash surrender value. Furthermore, it had declared that,
even if that part of the proceeds which represented the cash surrender
value constituted property of the deceased taxpayer in the hands of
the beneficiary as transferee, there was no liability on the part of
the beneficiary under applicable state law.26
By its decisions in Stern and Bess, the Supreme Court has ex-
tracted from this potpourri of opinion a set of definitive principles:
(1) In no case may the Commissioner recover from the bene-
ficiary an amount in excess of the cash surrender value of the policy
at the time of the insured's death.
(2) Where under state law the cash surrender value of a life in-
surance policy constitutes the exclusive property of the insured dur-
ing his lifetime, the unpaid taxes may become a lien on this interest
under section 6321, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, upon the tax-
payer's neglect or refusal to pay after notice and demand prior to
his death. The Commissioner may then apply to the tax deficiency
that part of the proceeds received by the beneficiary which represents
the cash surrender value at the time of the insured's death. This would
be true even though the law of the domicile of the beneficiary pro-
vides that the beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds against all
creditors in the absence of fraud.
A minority of states appear to take the view that the beneficiary
has a vested property right in the entire proceeds subject to being
2 3 Mary Stoumen, 27 T.C. 1014 (1957); Aura Grimes Bales, 22 T.C. 355
(1954); Christine D. Muller, 10 T.C. 678 (1948).24 Rowan v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 641 (2d Cir. 1954).25 United States v. Bess, 243 F. 2d 675 (3d Cir. 1957).26 Comnssioner v. Stem, 242 F. 2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957).
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divested through the exercise by the insured of certain of his re-
tained incidents of ownership; i.e. the right to change the bene-
ficiary or the right to give up the policy for cancellation in return
for the cash surrender value.27 Under this interpretation, the bene-
ficiary, and not the insured, would have exclusive property rights
in that part of the proceeds which represents the cash surrender value.
According to the opinion in the Bess case, in these states there would
be no property of the insured to which the tax lien could attach
and it should follow that the beneficiary would be absolved of any
liability.
Though one commentator has placed Kentucky in this minority
of jurisdictions, 28 an examination of Kentucky cases indicates that
this classification may be erroneous. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has repeatedly stated that where, under the terms of the policy,
the insured retains the right to change the beneficiary or draw the
cash surrender value, the named beneficiary does not have a vested
interest therein. The rights of the one named in the policy are
conditional only, and are subject to being defeated by the terms of
the contract.29 It has further been held that after the insured has
elected to draw the cash surrender value it is subject to attachment as
his property.30 However, the court has also declared that the rights of
the beneficiary vest as of the death of the insured.31 This seems to
support the contention of the dissent in the Bess case that, though
the Government in a proper action may enforce the lien in the in-
sured's lifetime and thereby recover the cash surrender value,3 2 it
cannot recover any part of the proceeds paid to the beneficiary
after the death of the insured. The beneficiary has an exclusive prop-
erty right to the full proceeds of the policy which, not having been
previously defeated by the terms of the contract, either voluntarily
by the insured or involuntarily by his creditors (including the Gov-
ernment), vests on the death of the insured and cannot thereafter
be divested.
Due to the indefinite position of Kentucky law in this area and
to the interpretation which might be given it by the federal courts,
it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty what result would
27 Grayck, supra note 19, at 321. See also Pyle, "Liability of Life Insurance
and Annuities for Unpaid Income Taxes of Living Insureds, Annuitants, and Bene-
ficiaries," 9 Tax. L. Rev. 205, 215 (1954).
28 Grayck, supra note 19 at 321.
2 9 Crice v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 572, 92 S.W. 560 (1906); Wrather
v. Stacy, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 683, 82 S.W. 420 (Ct. App. 1904); Hopkins v. Hopkins'
Adm'r., 92 Ky. 824, 17 S.W. 864 (1891).30 Cooper v. West, 173 Ky. 289, 190 S.W. 1085 (1917).
81 Parks' Exrs. v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
32 357 U.S. at 57 n. 2.
[Vol. 47,
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be reached should a situation similar to that presented in the Bess
case arise in, this jurisdiction. However, there is at least some indi-
cation that it may be possible to distinguish that decision on the basis
of different state property law concepts.
(3) Where a lien for unpaid taxes has not been created on the
property of the insured under section 6321, Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, prior to his death, the existence and extent of the liability of
the beneficiary as a transferee of the insured under section 6901
(a) (1) (A) (i) of the 1954 code is determined by applicable state
law.
(a) If the state law provides that the beneficiary is not liable to
the creditors of the insured in the absence of a showing that the
premiums were paid in fraud of creditors,33 the burden of proof is
on the Commissioner to show that such intent to defraud was present.
If he fails to sustain this burden, he may not recover any part of the
tax deficiency from the proceeds.
(b) Even if the Commissioner is able to show fraud, the Court
in the Stern case seems to restrict his recovery to that allowed other
creditors under state law. It stated: "The Government's rights in this
case are precisely those which other creditors would have under Ken-
tucky law."3 4 In Kentucky, and in many other states, the statutes
allow recovery by defrauded creditors only to the extent of the
"tainted" premiums; i.e., those paid in defraud of creditors or while
the insured was insolvent.3 5 This amount more often than not is
considerably less than the cash surrender value, which the Commis-
sioner had previously been allowed to recover in cases of insolvency
or fraud.36
The most objectionable feature of these decisions is the non-
uniform, discriminatory manner in which they provide for federal in-
come tax liability of the life insurance beneficiary of the taxpayer.
As we have seen, whether or not the beneficiary is a transferee of
the insured within the rule of the Bess case may vary from state to
state, depending on whether the particular jurisdiction regards the
cash surrender value as property of the insured. Moreover, as the
dissent in the Stern case pointed out:
The laws of the several states are bound to vary widely with respect
to the responsibility of transferees for the obligations of their trans-
ferors. Therefore, application of state law leads to the anomalous re-
33 See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.691(1) & (2) (1959), quoted supra note 3.
34 357 U.S. at 47.
35 See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.691 (2) (1959), supra note 3.30 In Pearlman v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946), insolvency
of the insured prior to death was shown and satisfaction of the income tax liability




sult that transferees will be liable for federal taxes in one state but
not in another even though they stand in the same position.37
This anomaly is further compounded when one realizes that even
within the same jurisdiction, these decisions dictate opposite results
in factual situations quite similar in nature. That is, had the Bess
case and the Stern case arisen in the same jurisdiction-say, Kentucky-
the beneficiary might nevertheless have been held liable in the first
instance and not liable in the second. From a practical standpoint,
just as "taxpayers should be treated equally without regard to the
fortuity of residence," 8 so also should similar liability be placed on
their life insurance beneficiaries and/or other transferees, whether
or not the tax deficiency has been discovered and has become a lien
on the taxpayer's property prior to his death. In the end, these deci-
sions may do nothing more than provide a reward for diligence by
the Commissioner in uncovering tax deficiencies. However, it should
be kept in mind in this regard that many tax irregularities first come
to light on examination of the taxpayer's estate after his death.
Of course, the way is always open for Congress to impose a uni-
form system of transferee liability which would remove once and for
all any inequities created by these decisions. However, should the
Court, in the absence of any direct legislation in this area, ever
reconsider its position, either of two alternative solutions would
achieve a more equitable and more consistent result.
(1) By following the dissent in the Bess case, the Court might
hold that the tax lien which had attached to the cash surrender
value prior to the death of the taxpayer was extinguished thereby
and was not enforceable against any part of the proceeds. This
would at least place life insurance beneficiaries on a fairly equal
footing, at the expense of the Government. However, it would not
prevent non-uniform liability from being imposed on other trans-
ferees under section 6901 through application of the rule of the
Stern case to them. The subsequent case of United States v. Ott49
provides a good illustration of this situation. Action was brought by
the Government to recover from the widow-beneficiary the guaran-
teed cash refunds of annuity policies purchased by or on behalf of
the deceased tax debtor during his lifetime. The Government claimed
these proceeds on the theory that, since the purchaser owed income
taxes at the time of his death, the widow was a transferee without
consideration of the benefits of the policies under section 311 (a) (1)
of the 1939 Code, and held them as trustee for the benefit of the
37 357 U.S. at 47, 48.
38 Id. at 49.
39 166 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
[Vol. 47,
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creditors of the deceased (including the Government). The court
first held that, under the rule of the Stern case, the limits of the
Government's right to recover in any action initiated against a trans-
feree under section 311 are established by state law. Since the Mich-
igan statute40 specifically provided that, in the absence of fraud,
proceeds from contracts of annuity are exempt from the claims of
creditors of the purchaser, where payable to someone other than the
debtor, the court concluded as a matter of law that the Government
was barred from any recovery of the proceeds of the annuity contracts.
(2) The Court could impose a uniform system of transferee lia-
bility based on the reasoning of the dissent in the Stern case. This
would insure that the result of the Ott case would not be reached in
other similar cases. Since all claims of the Federal Government have
long received preferred treatment over the claims of ordinary
creditors,41 and since enforcement and collection of the Federal in-
come tax is a matter of peculiarly national concern, the Court would
have both precedent and policy behind it should it adopt this solution.
John T. Bondurant
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-COMMENT-EFFECT ON
RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE AND SURVIVING JOINT TENANT
OF MORTGAGE EXECUTED BY DECEASED JOINT TENANT
Appellant and her now deceased husband owned real property
in fee simple as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The deceased
husband, without the consent or knowledge of his wife, executed a
mortgage upon the property to the respondents. The state com-
menced an action to condemn the property, alleging that the appellant
owned the property and respondents were the mortgagees thereof.
Appellant answered that she was the sole owner of the property
and that respondents had no right, title, or interest therein. Respon-
40 Mich. Comp. Laws § 522.24 (1948).41 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952), provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors
or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the de-
ceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied.,...
Unpaid taxes have been held to constitute "debts due to the United States" within
the meaning of this section and are entitled to be first satisfied in case of the
taxpayer's insolvency. Massachusetts v. United States, 833 U.S. 611 (1948).
However, under § 64 (a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (4) (1952), the United States has only a fourth
priority in bankruptcy for its unsecured tax claims, along with other unsecured
tax claimants; moreover, by virtue of § 64(a) (5) of the same Act, 30 Stat. 563
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (5) (1952), it has only a fifth priority
for unsecured non-tax claims.
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